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Inconsistencies and Composition, and the Value Relevance of 
Non-GAAP Earnings of Red Chip Companies 
ABSTRACT 
We examine the relevance of non-GAAP earnings (NGE) reporting in annual reports in a 
less regulated and less intense information environment, the environment of Red Chip 
companies of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). It also examines the relevance of 
reporting and measurement inconsistencies, and composition. Red Chip companies are 
mainland China companies that are controlled directly or indirectly by the Chinese 
government and listed in the HKSE. NGE are additional disclosures, and Red Chip 
companies are primarily listed in the HKSE to seek foreign investment. We find that 
adjusted results and EBITDA are common forms of NGE reporting, and tax, 
interest/financial cost, and gain/loss on investment are the main adjustment items used to 
derive NGE, not all firms make identical adjustments across years and there are variations 
in reporting across firms. GAAP earnings (GE) rather than NGE are value relevant. 
Adjustment inconsistencies influence the value relevance of reported NGE.  
 
Key Words: non-GAAP earnings (NGE), GAAP earnings (GE), relevance, reporting 
inconsistencies, adjustments inconsistencies 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Non-GAAP earnings (NGE) disclosures are increasing around the world, and the 
controversy surrounding its relevance continues to grow (Alpert 2001; Bradshaw & 
Sloan 2002; Cameron, Percy, & Stevenson-Clarke, 2012). Advocates of NGE argue 
that NGE reporting reduces information asymmetry and helps investors to better 
understand a firm’s financial results because NGE disclosures remove the effects of 
non-recurring items (Bhattacharya et al.2003; Johnson et al. 2005; Lougee & Marquardt 
2004). Harvey Pitt, the 26th chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), stated that “investors anxious for current, simplified and comprehensible 
financial reporting are today more likely to rely on a company’s ‘non-GAAP’ 
disclosures than its meticulously prepared, mandated GAAP financial disclosures” (Pitt, 
2001). As some items become too complex for the investors, by making adjustments, 
investors may compare and contrast more easily a company’s financial performance.  
 
However, the critics of NGE argue that NGE are not well-defined and inconsistencies 
in its characteristics mislead investors. Companies have considerable large latitude in 
how to calculate NGE, as there is no authoritative guidance on excluded items (Alpert 
2000; Robison 2001). The concern is that companies use NGE primarily to focus 
investor attention on earnings numbers that exclude relevant expenses (Burns 2001; 
Henry 2001). Several highly publicized accounting scandals such as the fall of 
WorldCom and the collapse of Enron have further added investors’ skepticism about 
the unaudited, nonstandard NGE figures (Alpert 2000; Elstein, 2001). Furthermore, 
critics are concerned that NGE reporting in a firm’s current period may not be 
comparable and consistent to its NGE reporting in prior years (Jaffe, 2002).  
 
There are mixed findings for relevance of NGE in prior studies. Some studies show that 
NGE have more relevant information than GE (Bradshaw & Sloan, 2002; Lougee & 
Marquardt, 2004; Bowen et al., 2005; Aubert, 2009). However, Brown & Sivakumar 
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(2003) argue that if markets are not efficient then investors could be erroneously 
focusing on lower quality earnings numbers, i.e., NGE. This is suggested by the results 
of Bhattacharya et al., (2003) who find that naïve investors tend to be influenced more 
than the sophisticated investors by NGE. Such concerns were also raised by Biddle et 
al. (1997), who found that GAAP earnings (GE) explain share returns better than NGE. 
 
In addition to market efficiency, there are other matters worthy of consideration. Most 
prior studies were conducted in the US, which has many competing sources of 
information and more stringent disclosure requirements than most other capital markets 
in the world. Most of these studies also study only those firms that have analyst 
following. Such firms are mostly large firms. Many studies use only indicators of NGE 
collected from databases and do not actually check whether the firms are disclosing 
NGE or not. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) support this contention by adding “research that 
employs I/B/E/S actual earnings figures …, or standard Compustat data items … based 
on all or part of the I/B/E/S-Compustat population—as a proxy for manager-disclosed 
pro forma earnings, may not adequately capture the characteristics of the relatively 
small subset of firms whose managers voluntarily select to report these numbers in 
select quarterly earnings press releases.”  
 
Lastly, many prior studies assume that a variety of reporting practices and measurement 
methods are being adopted by the firms, but they do not examine the actual reporting 
and measurement practices used by the firms. The components of NGE most studies 
use are from databases and not from actual financial reports of the firms. Bhattacharya 
et al. (2003) raise the following concern about databases as a source of NGE: “… we 
feel that the use of commercial database populations to proxy for management-issued 
adjusted-GAAP figures can largely obscure the unique characteristics of this select 
group of firms that voluntarily discloses pro forma earnings figures.” 
 
This study examines the relevance of NGE measures reported by Red Chip companies 
in a setting and with procedures that address the shortcomings of earlier research. To 
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deal with the issues of competing sources of information we conduct our study using 
companies that are in an environment with lower levels of competing information and 
lower requirements for regulated disclosures. These companies are the Red Chip 
companies listed in Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE). Red Chip companies are 
mainland China companies that are controlled directly or indirectly by the Chinese 
government but listed in the HKSE. Red Chip stocks are expected to maintain the 
reporting requirements of the HKSE, which makes them a major outlet for foreign 
investors who wish to participate in the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.1 Firstly, 
Hong Kong stock exchange has lower levels of regulation than the US capital market. 
Secondly, the Red Chip companies have much lower levels of analyst following than 
the US capital market firms covered in the US studies. An added benefit of using Red 
Chip companies is their strong desire to seek investment from overseas and to expand 
rapidly. Likewise, overseas investors see Red Chip companies as a conduit for 
investments in mainland Chinese companies. Paul Chan, the former President of the 
Hong Kong Institute of Certified Public Accountants, said “looking at it from the 
perspective of mainland companies, if you want to raise capital from international 
investors, in particular institutional investors, you don’t have much choice in terms of 
a listing location” (http://app1.hkicpa.org.hk/APLUS/06_oct/22.pdf, 23). Therefore, to 
attract foreign capital, Red Chip companies are likely to use NGE and, at the same time, 
investors are likely to seek additional information some of which can be derived from 
the reported NGE. 
 
To deal with the issue of actual disclosures, we collect all our NGE data from the annual 
reports of Red Chip companies. Finally, to address the shortcoming of not covering 
actual reporting practices and measurement methods, we cover issues such as 
composition, reporting inconsistencies and adjustment or measurement inconsistencies 
between years by identifying the level of inconsistencies in the reporting of NGE and 
inconsistencies between years in the types of adjustments made to compute NGE.   
                                                             
1 http://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/redchip.asp#axzz2JW21bugZ  
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We analyze the annual reports of 92 Red Chip companies in 2010 and 2011, and find 
that 79 firms (78 firms) reported NGE metrics in 2010 and 2011. Results show that 
adjusted results and EBITDA are common forms of NGE reporting, and tax, 
interest/financial cost, and gain/loss on investment are the three main adjustment items 
used to derive NGE, not all firms make identical adjustments across years and there are 
variations in reporting across firms. We also find that GAAP earnings (GE) rather than 
NGE are relevant to the capital market. While the form of reporting has no significant 
association with market returns, adjustment inconsistencies impact the relevance of 
NGE. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the applicable literature. 
Section 3 develops hypotheses. Section 4 discusses the research design. Section 5 
presents the empirical results. Section 6 summaries the research findings, identifies the 
limitations of this study and provides recommendations for future research. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
In this literature review we first examine the research that deals with what comprises 
NGE, i.e., the composition of NGE. Then we review the research pertaining to 
consistency of NGE reporting and measurement. Finally, we review studies that deal 
with value relevance of NGE. 
 
2.1 Composition 
Two types of items, recurring and non-recurring items, are used for adjusting GE to 
NGE. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) of the USA encourages only 
the use of non-recurring items. It addresses NGE in Reg. § 210.11-02(b)5 of Regulation 
S-X2 in the following manner: “The pro forma condensed income statement shall 
                                                             
2Regulation S-X, the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1982. 
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disclose income (loss) from continuing operations before nonrecurring charges or 
credits ...” However, managers in recent years have altered the definition of NGE to a 
firm's GAAP earnings (GE) adjusted to provide a number that reflects the directors' 
assessment of the results of the ongoing business activities of the firm.  
 
In order to identify the composition of NGE disclosures, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) link 
manager’s motives to different types of earnings adjustments. Choi et al. (2007) 
investigate the specific adjustments over which analysts disagree and suggest that 
managers tend to correctly include or exclude transitory earnings components. Most 
people agree that the exclusion of one-time items allows managers to better reflect 
recurring earnings. However, many managers also exclude recurring items to arrive at 
their NGE results (Christensen, 2007). Black & Christensen (2009) argue that the most 
likely place to find aggressive reporting is when managers exclude items that are 
generally believed to be recurring in nature. In accordance with these studies, a simple 
way to class the composition of NGE disclosure is to examine the types of adjustments 
that managers make.  
 
2.2 Consistency 
Regarding consistency of NGE disclosures, Weil (2001) argues that NGE figures are 
not comparable across firms. Levisohn (2002) supports Weil’s argument by showing 
that no standard, agreed-upon definition of NGE exists. Jaffe (2002) find that even 
individual firms do not use a consistent definition of NGE across years. Likewise, 
inconsistencies can arise in three ways. First, different firms may report different NGE 
measures, as for example, report earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) or earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). Second, firms can 
inconsistently report NGE measures across years. For example, in one year they may 
report just EBIT and in the following year they may report EBITDA or both. Third, the 
items of adjustments firms leave out from GE or add to GE to arrive at their NGE can 
vary between years. While the variations in adjustments can occur for both recurring 
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and non-recurring items, the variations in recurring items are visible in the reporting 
terms of the NGE used (e.g., EBIT suggests exclusion of recurring items such as interest 
and taxes), but the variation in non-recurring items are generally less visible (e.g., 
exclusion of one-off gain or loss on disposal of assets, which is not stated in the name 
of the metric used for reporting NGE). 
 
2.3 Relevance  
NGE reporting is a form of voluntary disclosure over and above the regulated 
disclosures. The consequence of NGE reporting is either to offer a clearer picture of the 
firm’s performance, or to mislead the investors. Managers who support NGE reporting 
claim NGE provide additional useful relevant information and help investors to better 
evaluate the firm’s performance. By excluding unusual items, the NGE information 
enables managers to reveal the firm’s true economic performance to the market. 
Bhattacharya et al. (2003) and Frederickson & Miller (2004) find that reported NGE 
are more informative than GAAP earnings for small investors. Analyst tracking 
services from other empirical studies also find the NGE measures are more closely 
associated with the stock price and more predictive of future earnings (Bradshaw & 
Sloan 2002; Brown & Sivakumar 2003). In addition, Entwistle et al (2010) suggest that 
NGE disclosures provide investors with a better quality measure of the firm’s 
performance when GE is not informative.  
 
However, other causes for disclosing NGE is that managers attempt to have the firm 
viewed as being more profitable and meeting or exceeding analysts’ forecasts. Some 
argue investors are misled when they believe that NGE is GAAP-based (Elliot, 2004; 
Frederickson & Miller, 2004). Neither Elliot nor Frederickson & Miller find evidence 
to prove sophisticated investors are influenced by NGE. 
 
Sender (2002) finds some firms use NGE reporting to obscure the negative earnings 
surprise. Bowen et al. (2004) suggest that firms tend to emphasize NGE when GE is 
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negative. Lougee & Marquardt (2004) provide evidence that NGE figure were disclosed 
by Enron. In general, managers tend to avoid reporting losses, and disappointments 
(Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsunaga & Park, 2001). This behavior often draws the 
attention of the critics and the regulators. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses 
To sum up, prior studies on the consequence of NGE reporting provide mixed results. 
Some show NGE provide additional information to investors, and others show NGE 
provide misleading information to investors or are of limited informativeness. If NGE 
provide better information then it should be related to the firms’ market returns, the 
change in the economic value of during the year (Bradshaw & Sloan 2002; Brown & 
Sivakumar 2003). However, if NGE are misleading then the reported NGE would have 
a negative association with market returns. Looking at both sides of the debate, we 
construe that reported NGE can either be positively or negatively related to market 
returns or, in other words, it could be relevant or irrelevant. 
 
Likewise, we leave the direction the association between NGE and market returns for 
an empirical assessment and establish a null hypothesis in the following form: 
 
H1: NGE measures have no association with market returns.  
 
As mentioned in the literature review, inconsistencies can occur in three different ways 
(1) between firms, (2) between years reporting in the same firm, and (3) between years 
measurement in the same firm (differing adjustment items). All of these inconsistencies 
can be detrimental to the reliability of the NGE and reduce the relevance of the NGE 
reported.   
 
Doyle, Lundholm and Soliman (2003) find that NGE adjustments, broadly, are value 
relevant, but lament that NGE adjustments “do not sort neatly into particular line item 
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categories or accrual categories” (p. 148). While research has identified the value 
relevance of NGE as a whole, the issue of different types of NGE reported and their 
inconsistencies between years remains unresolved. In this regard, it can be argued that 
changes in reporting and adjusting inconsistencies could act as signals to the investors 
about the changing operational activities and strategies of the firm. However, the 
inconsistencies could also be reporting manipulations, and therefore be of little direct 
benefit to the investors or even be of negative consequence. If inconsistencies are 
reporting signals then these consistencies should enhance the association of market 
returns with NGE. However, if they are manipulations then there would be no 
association or in bad years a negative association between market returns and NGE. 
Given these opposing arguments, we leave the evaluation of the effects to an empirical 
assessment and draw the following null hypotheses: 
 
H2: The form of the reported NGE does not affect the association of market returns 
with NGE. 
 
H3: The level of the between year inconsistencies in the form of the reported NGE does 
not affect the association of market returns with NGE. 
 
H4: The level of the between year inconsistencies in the items of adjustments used to 
compute the NGE does not affect the association of market returns with NGE. 
 
One way to better relate NGE with firm performance would be to provide reconciliation 
between GE and NGE (Elliott, 2006). Likewise, we hypothesize  
 
H5: Reconciliation between GE and NGE enhances the association of market returns 
with NGE. 
 
Composition of NGE in terms of recurring and non-recurring items is also an important 
concern of the researchers and regulators. Prior studies argue that the exclusion of non-
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recurring items allows managers to better reflect recurring earnings (Bhattacharya et 
al.2003; Johnson et al. 2005; Lougee & Marquardt 2004). However, managers also 
exclude recurring items to arrive at their NGE results (Christensen, 2007). Black & 
Christensen (2009) regard this as aggressive accounting because it can mislead the 
investors.  
 
Based on the view that recurring items are misleading, we hypothesize: 
 
H6: Recurring items adjustments are negatively associated with market returns.  
 
Based on the view that non-recurring items are informative, we hypothesize: 
 
H7: Non-recurring items adjustments are positively associated with market returns. 
 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample comprises of Red Chip companies listed on the HKSE Statistics and 
Research website (www.hkex.com.hk/eng/stat/smstat/chidimen/cd_rcmb.htm) as at 
31/12/11. The initial sample had 107 Red Chip companies. Firms in the financial sector 
are excluded because of their separate regulatory regimes for disclosures. Annual 
reports of sample firms are collected from morningstar.com. Market related data 
(market capitalization) are collected from sina.com.cn. After eliminating firms with 
missing information, the final sample has 92 firms covering fiscal years 2010 and 2011. 
Details of the sample selection are shown in Table 1 Panel A.  
 
Panel B of Table 1 details the breakdown of the sample by industry sector and 
identifies the number of observations with valid data. The dominant industry sector in 
this study is the Consumer sector followed by Property and Industrial sectors. To 
arrive at the valid observations we exclude all outliers that are found after computing 
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the variables with continuous data. The outlier removal criteria were NGE < 1, GE < 
1, MKTRETURN < 1, and SURPRISE < 0.20. As observed in Panel B, the industry 
sector distribution is not altered significantly after the removal of the outliers.   
 
Table 1:  
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 Panel A: Sample selection process 
1. Total firms 107 
2. Less firms in the financial sector 9  
3. Less firm listed in 2011 1  
3. Less firms listed in 2010 2  
4. Less firms with missing data 3  
5. Total firms used in study 92  
 
 
Panel B: Sample firms reporting NGE by sectors 
 
  
Sample Companies 
Observations With Valid 
Data** 
2010 2011 2010 2011 
NGE 
Firms Total 
NGE 
Firms Total 
NGE 
Firms Total 
NGE 
Firms Total 
Basic Material 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 
Communication 5 8 5 8 5 7 5 8 
Consumer 23 24 22 24 17 18 18 20 
Diversified 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 
Energy 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Industrial 12 16 12 16 11 15 11 15 
Property 15 17 15 17 13 14 13 15 
Technology 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 
Utilities 8 8 8 8 7 7 8 8 
Total* 79 92 78 92 68 79 70 84 
Percentage 86% 100% 85% 100% 86% 100% 83% 100% 
* 13 sample firms did not disclose NGE metrics in 2010, 14 sample firms did not disclose 
NGE metrics in 2011. The sample firm which disclosed NGE metrics in 2010, but not in 2011 
could not do so because of changing audit firms.  
**Because of high skewness and kurtosis, we removed all outliers using the following criteria 
NGE < 1, GE < 1, MKTRETURN < 1, SURPRISE < 0.20.  
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3.2 Research Models 
This study primarily examines the value relevance of reported NGE by empirically 
testing the association of reported NGE with a firm’s market returns (H1). This test of 
relevance is in accordance with those of Bradshaw & Sloan (2002), Chen (2010) and 
Entwistle et al. (2010). In addition, we also examine the intervening effects of the form 
of NGE reported to assess the between firm NGE reporting inconsistencies (H2), the 
inconsistencies across years in the form of reported NGE (H3), the inconsistencies 
across years in the adjustments made to compute NGE (H4), and GE and NGE 
reconciliation (H5). These tests are specified in Model 1. 
 
MKTRETURN = β0 +β1NGE + β2GE + β3INCONSISTENCIES + 
β4NGE*INCONSISTENCIES + β5RECON + β6NGE*RECON + β7CONTROLS 
+ ε           (Model 1) 
 
We also examine the effects of composition of NGE in terms of recurring (H6) and non-
recurring (H7) items removed from GE to arrive at NGE. The tests involved are 
stipulated in Model 2.  
 
MKTRETURN = β0 +β1RECURRING + β2NON-RECURRING + 
β3INCONSISTENCIES + β4RECURRING* INCONSISTENCIES + β5NON-
RECURRING*INCONSISTENCIES + β6RECON + β7RECURRING*RECON + 
β8NON-RECURRING*RECON + β9CONTROLS + ε       
    (Model 2) 
 
Where,  
INCONSISTENCIES = (1) Between firm form of NGE reporting inconsistencies, (2) 
Between year within firm form of reporting inconsistencies, and (3) Between year 
within firm GE to NGE adjustment inconsistencies. 
RECON = Reconciliation of GE and NGE. 
 12 
 
RECURRING = Total amount of usual items added back to or deducted from GE to 
arrive at the reported NGE.  
NON-RECURRING = Total amount of unusual items added back to or deducted from 
GE to arrive at the reported NGE. 
CONTROLS = Other variables that are also known to be associated with stock returns 
(Rahman & Debreceny, 2010).  
 
3.2.1 Dependent and Independent Variables Measurement  
The variables were measured as follows. The dependent variable is a simple measure 
of value relevance, annual market return (MKTRETURN). Annual market return is 
current year closing market capitalization minus closing market capitalization of the 
prior year divided by the closing market capitalization of prior year. A significant 
positive association of annual market return and reported NGE would suggest that NGE 
are value relevant for the investors. A significant negative association would suggest 
that NGE are of adverse consequence for the investors, and a no association would 
mean that NGE are not relevant to the investors.  
 
NGE is computed as the years reported NGE measure divided by the end of year total 
assets. Where a company has more than one reported NGE, the NGE with the largest 
magnitude is used in the multivariate regression analyses. 
 
GE is an essential control variable for this study. It is assumed that investors would be 
observing GE alongside NGE while making investment decisions. It is the statutory 
profit (GE) divided by total assets.  
 
Our three INCONSISTENCIES variables are measure as follows:  
(1) For the between firm form of NGE reporting inconsistencies, we use dichotomous 
(scores of 1, 0) variables for each of the forms listed below. We use both the main effects 
and the interaction effects of these dichotomous variables to see how the use of these 
forms affects the market returns and the association between market returns and NGE. 
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1. Adjusted results 
2. EBIT 
3. EBITDA 
4. Adjusted pre-tax income 
5. Profit/loss from operation before items 
6. Core operating profit/loss 
 
(2) For the between year within firm form of reporting inconsistencies, we compare the 
use of all the forms of reporting NGE shown above. If s firm switches between these 
forms or drops or adds a form from 2010 to 2011 then we score a 1. We sum all the 
scores for all the switches between the forms to arrive at a reporting consistencies score 
(REPORTING-INCONSISTENCIES).  
 
(3) For the between year within firm GE to NGE adjustment inconsistencies, we 
compare the use of all the main adjustments shown below. If a firm switches between 
these adjustments or drops or adds an adjustment from 2010 to 2011 then we score a 1. 
We sum all the scores for all the switches between the adjustments to arrive at a 
adjustments inconsistencies score (ADJUSTMENT- INCONSISTENCIES).  
1. Tax 
2. Interest finance costs 
3. Depreciation and amortization 
4. Fair value adjustments 
5. Gain loss on investment 
6. Gain loss on share of Profit or Loss of Associate 
7. Impairment of goodwill 
8. Acquisitions disposals 
9. Gain loss on exchange 
10. Profit loss from disposal of assets 
11. Unallocated income expenses 
12. General and Undisclosed expenses 
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Our reconciliation variable, RECON, is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if there is a 
reconciliation between GE and NGE, otherwise coded as 0. 
 
For RECURRING and NON-RECURRING we divide the total amount of usual and 
unusual items, respectively, added back to or deducted from GE to arrive at the reported 
NGE and divide it by total assets.  
 
We regard the following adjustments to be usual (recurring) items: 
1. Tax 
2. Interest finance costs 
3. Depreciation and amortization 
 
We regard the following adjustments to be unusual (non-recurring) items: 
4. Fair value adjustments 
5. Gain loss on investment 
6. Gain loss on share of Profit or Loss of Associate 
7. Impairment of goodwill 
8. Acquisitions disposals 
9. Gain loss on exchange 
10. Profit loss from disposal of assets 
11. Unallocated income expenses 
12. General and Undisclosed expenses 
 
The control variables we use and their measurement are as follows: 
 
SURPRISE is the difference between profit in the current year and the profit in prior 
year, divided by total assets. A positive or negative difference would indicate an 
improving or deteriorating condition for the company, which is likely to affect annual 
market returns positively or negatively, respectively.  
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Corporate governance variables such as board independence and independent audit 
committees are important for ensuring better firm performance, particularly for 
companies of developing markets seeking international investments (Cheng, Courtenay, 
and Rahman, 2011). We control for these variables. Board independence (BI) is 
measured as the proportion of independent directors to the total number of board of 
directors. Independent audit committees (IAC) are the proportion of independent audit 
committee members to the total number of audit committee members. 
 
We also control for ownership concentration (OC). High ownership concentration 
companies are known to have lower share floats, which in turn leads to weaker 
associations between market returns and accounting other disclosures (Rahman & 
Debreceny, 2010). OC in this study is the proportion of shares owned by block holders 
with shareholdings greater than 5%. 
 
High leverage (LEV) firms tend to have lower market returns. From a stock holder 
perspective high leverage is a source of financial risk (Rahman & Debreceny, 2010). 
Likewise, we control for leverage in our multivariate analyses. LEV in this study is the 
total liabilities at the end of the year divided by total assets. 
 
Company size (SIZE) is known to affect market returns, with small firms having higher 
returns than mid-level and large firms (Banz, 1981). We control for size effects. SIZE 
in this study is the natural log of total assets. 
 
It is likely that loss making firms would provide additional information to reduce 
investor disappointment and shore up market returns (Degeorge et al. 1999; Matsunaga 
& Park, 2001). We control for the effects of loss (LOSS) by using a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the current year has a net loss, otherwise coded 0. 
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Auditors provide credibility to corporate information. Accordingly, companies audited 
by large audit firms tend to have higher market returns (Teoh and Wong, 1993). We 
control for auditor quality by using a dichotomous variable (BIG4) coded as 1 if the 
firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, otherwise coded 0. 
 
Institutional ownership of companies adds additional scrutiny to the governance 
arrangements, which reduces firm level risks. Accordingly, companies with 
institutional ownership are likely to have higher market returns. We control for 
institutional ownership by using a dichotomous variable (INSTITUTIONAL) coded as 
1 if the firm has institutional ownership, otherwise coded 0. 
 
We also control for year. This allows for control of serial correlation and any between 
year macro-economic and regulatory changes. Year is coded as 1 for the 2011 
observations and 0 for 2010. 
 
Close followed firms such as firms belonging to market indices tend to be better 
performers. Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations index companies are controlled 
by having a dichotomous variable, HSCCI25, which is coded as 1 if the firm is one of 
the 25 indexed firms and 0 otherwise. 
 
The effects of firms listing in markets other than the HKSE are controlled by 
introducing a dichotomous variable, GLOBAL, which is coded as 1 if the firm is also 
listed in other countries, otherwise 0 for listing only in HKSE. 
 
We also control for industry effects by including one dichotomous variable for each 
industry. If a firm belongs to an industry this variable is scored as 1 and 0 otherwise, in 
the following manner. 
 
Basic = 1 if the firm is classified into “Basic Materials”, otherwise 0 
Communication = 1 if the firm is classified into “Communications”, otherwise 0 
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Consumer = 1 if the firm is classified into “Consumer”, otherwise 0 
Diversified = 1 if the firm is classified into “Diversified Operations”, otherwise 0 
Energy = if the firm is classified into “Energy”, otherwise 0 
Industrial = 1 if the firm is classified into “Industrial”, otherwise 0 
Property  = 1 if the firm is classified into “Property”, otherwise 0 
Technology = 1 if the firm is classified into “Technology”, otherwise 0 
Utilities = 1 if the firm is classified into “Utilities”, otherwise 0 
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the variable measurement criteria. 
 
Table 2: Variables Measurement Summary 
 
Variable Measurement Criteria 
MKTRETURN  annual market return  
NGE  reported NGE measure divided by the end of year total assets. Where a 
company has more than one reported NGE, the NGE measure with the 
largest magnitude (positive or negative) is used 
GE  reported GE divided by total assets.  
AR  1 if the firm reports adjusted results, otherwise 0 
EBIT  1 if the firm reports EBIT, otherwise 0 
EBITDA 1 if the firm reports EBITDA, otherwise 0 
API  1 if the firm reports Adjusted pre-tax income, otherwise 0 
PFO  1 if the firm reports Profit/loss from operation before items, otherwise 0 
CP  1 if the firm reports Core operating profit/loss before items, otherwise 0 
RECURRING  usual items added back to or deducted from GE to arrive at the reported 
NGE and divide it by total assets 
NON-RECURRING  unusual items added back to or deducted from GE to arrive at the 
reported NGE and divide it by total assets 
REPORTING 
INCONSISTENCIES  
number of switches between forms of NGE reporting or dropping or 
adding a form between 2010 and 2011 
ADJUSTMENT- 
INCONSISTENCIES  
number of switches between adjustments or dropping or adding 
adjustments between 2010 and 2011 
RECON  1 if there is a reconciliation between GE and NGE, otherwise 0. 
SURPRISE  difference between profit in current year and profit in prior year, divided 
by total assets 
BI  proportion of independent board members to the total number of board 
members 
IAC  proportion of independent audit committee members to the total number 
of audit committee members 
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OC  proportion of shares owned by block holders with shareholdings greater 
than 5%. 
LEV  total liabilities at the end of the year divided by total assets. 
SIZE  natural log of total assets. 
LOSS  1 if the current year has a net loss, otherwise 0 
BIG4  1 if the firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor, otherwise 0 
INSTITUTIONAL  1 if the firm has institutional ownership, otherwise 0 
YEAR  1 for the 2011 observations and 0 for 2010 
HSCCI25  1 if the firm is a Hang Seng China-Affiliated Corporations index 
company, otherwise 0 
GLOBAL  1 if the firm is also listed in other countries, otherwise 0 
Basic  1 if the firm is classified into “Basic Materials”, otherwise 0 
Communication  1 if the firm is classified into “Communications”, otherwise 0 
Consumer  1 if the firm is classified into “Consumer”, otherwise 0 
Diversified  1 if the firm is classified into “Diversified Operations”, otherwise 0 
Energy  1 if the firm is classified into “Energy”, otherwise 0 
Industrial  1 if the firm is classified into “Industrial”, otherwise 0 
Property  1 if the firm is classified into “Property”, otherwise 0 
Technology  1 if the firm is classified into “Technology”, otherwise 0 
Utilities  1 if the firm is classified into “Utilities”, otherwise 0 
 
4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 
The descriptive statistics, and the results of the bivariate and multivariate analyses are 
discussed in this section.  
 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. These statistics are based on our earlier 
stated measurement criteria. We have a mix of continuous and dichotomous variables. 
Most continuous variables were scaled and some were even converted to natural logs 
due to their high skewness or kurtosis or both. For signed variables, especially when 
they are control variables, we did not use natural logs for normalizing the variables 
because it would distort the basic characteristic of the variable or would not deal with 
normality issues. Several of our dichotomous variables (with 1, 0 measures) were 
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skewed or had high kurtosis, or both. Normalization procedures are not appropriate or 
helpful for these variables. 
 
Interesting variables to note from the Table 3 statistics are MKTRETURN. NGE, GE, 
the forms of NGE reporting, RECURRING, NON-RECURRING, ADJUSTMENT- 
INCONSISTENCIES, and RECON. MKTRETURN is reasonably normally distributed 
and ranges from a very low -0.747 to high 0.954. This is based on observations after 
excluding the outliers. It seems that Red Chip companies had major fluctuations in 
market value in the years 2009, 2010 and 2011. NGE and GE are reasonably normally 
distributed, and NGE are generally higher than GE. The forms of NGE reporting have 
a variety of distributions. AR (adjusted results) is the most popular of the forms of NGE 
with 61% of the companies using it as a form of reported NGE. This is followed by 
EBITDA and PFO which are reported by 23% of the companies. RECURRING (usual 
items of adjustment) on the whole exceed NON-RECURRING (unusual items of 
adjustment). Its mean is 0.026 and the mean of NON-RECURRING is -0.006. However, 
NON-RECURRING has a wide variation in terms of spread, with a minimum of -0.230 
and a maximum of 0.230. Both REPORTING INCONSISTENCIES and 
ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES range between 1 and 3, with means of 0.740 and 
0.472, and are generally normally distributed. Note that mean of inconsistencies are 
less than 1, suggesting that it is not as numerous as normally argued by the critics of 
NGE. The mean of RECON is leaning towards a maximum of 1 (Mean of 0.790). 
 
The range of the proportion of independent directors (BI) is from 0.180 to 0.500. The 
minimum proportion of independent directors suggest that some companies do not 
satisfy the “one third” independent directors required by Chinese Corporate Law. 
However, the mean of the proportion of independent directors is 0.335, which suggests 
that on average firms satisfy the criteria. The mean of the proportion of independent 
audit committee members is 0.924, which indicates a very high number of independent 
audit committee firms in the sample firms. The average of ownership concentration is 
0.635, with a range of 0.216 to 0.992, indicates that the sample firms have a wide span 
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of ownership concentration, and that most firms have concentrated ownership. Note 
that Red Chip companies are controlled directly or indirectly by the Chinese 
government. Ownership is one of the means of control. 
 
The high means of BIG4, INSTITUTIONAL and GLOBAL indicate that most sample 
firms are audited by the big four auditing firms, have institutional ownership, and listed 
not only in Hong Kong. The low mean values of LOSS, and HSCCI25 suggest that very 
few firms had poor performance in 2010 and 2011 and a majority were not HSCCI 
firms.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
MKTRETURN -0.747 0.954 -0.183 0.313 0.900 1.263 
NGE -0.027 0.324 0.056 0.056 1.513 3.683 
GE -0.198 0.183 0.042 0.046 -0.455 5.209 
AR 0.000 1.000 0.610 0.488 -0.470 -1.801 
EBIT 0.000 1.000 0.060 0.229 3.931 13.62 
EBITDA 0.000 1.000 0.230 0.424 1.274 -0.382 
API 0.000 1.000 0.010 0.110 8.943 78.95 
PFO 0.000 1.000 0.230 0.420 1.316 -0.273 
CP 0.000 1.000 0.010 0.078 12.767 163 
RECURRING 0.000 0.180 0.026 0.029 2.325 8.018 
NON-RECURRING -0.230 0.230 -0.006 0.034 -0.405 25.755 
REPORTING 
INCONSISTENCIES 
0.000 3.000 0.740 0.935 0.872 -0.564 
ADJUSTMENT- 
INCONSISTENCIES 
0.000 3.000 0.472 0.756 1.396 0.832 
RECON 0.000 1.000 0.790 0.408 -1.448 0.097 
SURPRISE -0.265 0.197 0.011 0.045 -0.436 11.662 
BI 0.180 0.500 0.334 0.077 0.39 -0.538 
IAC 0.600 1.000 0.924 0.134 -1.326 0.072 
OC 0.216 0.992 0.635 0.151 -0.145 0.093 
LEV 0.000 0.935 0.463 0.214 -0.126 -0.730 
SIZE 9.856 18.846 14.216 1.793 0.121 -0.368 
LOSS 0.000 1.000 0.070 0.262 3.296 8.972 
BIG4 0.000 1.000 0.930 0.252 -3.48 10.239 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.000 1.000 0.950 0.217 -4.213 15.948 
YEAR 0.000 1.000 0.520 0.501 -0.062 -2.021 
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HSCCI25 0.000 1.000 0.230 0.424 1.274 -0.382 
GLOBAL 0.000 1.000 0.850 0.361 -1.942 1.792 
Valid N 163      
 
 
4.1.1. Reporting of NGE and the use of Adjustments 
 
Firms tend to report one or more measures of NGE in a single year. Table 4 shows these 
various combinations. The middle diagonal cells shaded in gray show the frequency of 
each form of reported NGE. The other cells in the same column show the other forms 
used in conjunction with the form stated in the column and row headers. So, with AR, 
which is reported in 100 firm-years, EBITDA is reported 23 times PFO is reported 9 
times and EBIT is reported 6 times. It is evident from the table that except for API and 
CP, all other forms are used concurrently with other forms.  
 
Table 4: Combinations of NGE 
 
 AR EBIT EBITDA API PFO CP 
AR 100 6 23 0 9 0 
EBIT 6 9 7 0 0 0 
EBITDA 23 7 38 0 13 0 
API 0 0 0 2 0 0 
PFO 9 0 13 0 37 0 
CP 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
 
4.1.2. Use of Adjustments  
 
As described in the variable measurement section, there are thirteen different 
adjustments commonly used by Red Chip companies to modify their GE into NGE. 
Three of these are usual items (RECURRING) others are unusual items (NON-
RECURRING). The descriptive statistics of these items are in Table 5. Two out of the 
three recurring items had a median greater than zero, and all of the non-recurring ones 
had a median of zero, which suggests that the partitioning between the two types of 
items is reasonably clear. It is noticeable that Depreciation and Amortization is by far 
the largest item of adjustment made by any one firm. Also, noticeable is that some 
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adjustments can have a negative effect on NGE (items with negative signs). One such 
item with a large amount is Gain or loss on investment.  Additionally, usual items are 
mostly larger than unusual items. Gain or Loss on share of Profit or Loss of Associate 
and Impairment of Goodwill are the only two adjustments where 2010 amounts were 
statistically different from those of 2011 amounts (p < 0.05).  
 
Companies often use more than one adjustment to compute NGE. Table 6 shows these 
various combinations of adjustments. The middle diagonal cells shaded in gray provide 
the frequency of each form of adjustment used. The other cells in the same column 
show the other adjustments used in conjunction with the adjustments stated in the 
column headers. So, with the 131 uses of Tax, Interest on Finance is used 127 times. 
For recurring items, Tax (131) and Interest on Finance (127) are common items of 
adjustment; and for nonrecurring items Gain or Loss on share of Profit or Loss of 
Associate (88), Gain or loss on investment (78), and Unallocated income or expense 
are the frequently used adjustments (61).  
 
 
4.1.3. Association between Form of Reported NGE and Adjustments  
 
Table 7 shows that certain adjustments are more associated with particular forms of 
reported NGE. There were 50 companies each year that reported adjusted results and 
most of these companies adjusted the results for tax, Interest on Finance, Gain or Loss 
on share of Profit or Loss of Associate, Gain or loss on investment, and Unallocated 
income or expenses. Tax, Interest on Finance, and Gain or Loss on share of Profit or 
Loss of Associate were also popular adjustments for EBITDA and PFO reporting. It is 
quite clear from Table 7 results that while many non-recurring items of profit and loss 
were used for adjusting GE to compute NGE, the two most popular items of adjustment 
were recurring items Tax and Interest on Finance.  
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Table 5: Amounts of Adjustments (US$ ’000) 
 
 2010 2011 
 Minimum Mean Median Maximum Count Minimum Mean Median Maximum Count 
Tax -52,331 171,174 8,852 6,270,948 79 -525 197,146 9,781 6,520,842 84 
Interest on Finance -5,343 48,989 6,837 436,633 79 -1,367 57,145 5,802 604,284 84 
Depreciation and 
Amortization 0 119,145 0 8,777,432 79 0 119,276 0 9,318,173 84 
Overall Recurring* -1,054 339,307 16,188 9,200,132 79 -525 373,566 20,311 9,775,080 84 
Fair value adjustments -380,202 -7,647 0 1,859 79 -417,972 -7,552 0 1,347 84 
Gain or loss on investment -1,393,847 -30,861 0 11,491 79 -1,853,806 -35,176 0 0 84 
Gain or Loss on share of 
Profit or Loss of Associate -344,817 -18,868 0 12,987 79 -654,606 -32,185 0 4,512 84 
Impairment of 
goodwill -13,240 5,608 0 324,314 79 -5,223 1,983 0 123,389 84 
Acquisitions or disposals -116,000 -5,726 0 0 79 -523,336 -8,193 0 888 84 
Gain or loss on exchange -159,797 -2,224 0 21,681 79 -102,302 -2,019 0 49,947 84 
Profit or loss from disposal -17,445 111 0 26,045 79 -867 208 0 17,932 84 
Unallocated income or exp. -160,734 1,508 0 59,904 79 -159,960 1,495 0 120,446 84 
General expenses -85,334 4,112 0 203,475 79 -726 5,464 0 230,810 84 
Others and Undisclosed -24,572 663 0 61,727 79 -27,099 471 0 59,872 84 
Overall Non-Recurring** -1,458,890 -45,678 0 162,337 79 -2,458,465 -67,952 -916 155,628 84 
Overall  -117,725 293,629 10,767 8,956,501 79 -259,694 305,614 12,259 9,504,790 84 
* The variable RECURRING is derived from this item after scaling by total assets. 
** The variable NON-RECURRING is derived from this item after scaling by total assets. 
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Table 6: Combinations of Adjustments 
 
 
 Tax 
Interest 
on 
Finance 
Depr 
or 
amort 
Fair value 
adjustments 
Gain or loss 
on 
investment 
Gain or Loss on 
share of Profit or 
Loss of Associate 
Impairment 
or goodwill 
Acquisitions 
or disposals 
Gain or 
loss on 
exchange 
Profit or 
loss from 
disposal 
Unallocated 
income or 
expense 
General 
expenses 
Others and 
Undisclosed 
Tax 131 127 8 25 77 87 14 27 13 7 59 29 19 
Interest on Finance 127 130 8 24 76 85 13 27 12 5 57 28 20 
Depreciation and 
Amortization 8 8 8 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 0 2 
Fair value adjustments 25 24 0 29 13 17 5 12 3 3 14 13 9 
Gain or loss on investment 77 76 3 13 78 57 7 18 12 5 28 23 15 
Gain or Loss on share of 
Profit or Loss of Associate 87 85 0 17 57 88 12 15 9 5 41 21 10 
Impairment or goodwill 14 13 0 5 7 12 16 9 1 0 8 9 3 
Acquisitions or disposals 27 27 1 12 18 15 9 28 4 1 11 13 8 
Gain or loss on exchange 13 12 0 3 12 9 1 4 13 0 3 5 2 
Profit or loss from disposal 7 5 0 3 5 5 0 1 0 7 0 5 0 
Unallocated income or exp 59 57 4 14 28 41 8 11 3 0 61 7 9 
General expenses 29 28 0 13 23 21 9 13 5 5 7 35 9 
Others and Undisclosed 19 20 2 9 15 10 3 8 2 0 9 9 21 
 
 
 25 
 
Table 7: NGE and Adjustments  
           (Some firms use multiple measures and most firms use more than one adjustment) 
NGE Year 
No. 
of 
Cos. Tax 
Interest 
on 
Finance 
Depr 
or 
Amort 
Fair value 
adjustments 
Gain or 
loss on 
investment 
Gain or Loss on 
share of Profit 
or Loss of 
Associate 
Impairment 
or goodwill 
Acquisitions 
or disposals 
Gain or 
loss on 
exchange 
Profit or 
loss from 
Disposal 
Unallocated 
income or 
expenses 
General 
expenses 
Others and 
Undisclosed 
AR 
2010 50 48 47 1 13 33 35 5 12 4 3 28 16 9 
2011 50 47 47 1 11 33 36 7 10 5 2 29 15 8 
EBITDA 
2010 20 19 20 4 3 13 13 1 3 1 2 8 3 1 
2011 18 18 18 4 2 11 11 3 4 1 0 8 1 1 
PFO 
2010 18 18 18 0 2 7 11 2 3 2 1 3 1 0 
2011 19 17 18 0 4 6 11 2 2 2 1 3 2 0 
EBIT 
2010 4 4 4 1 0 3 3 1 1 0 0 1 2 0 
2011 5 5 5 1 0 3 3 1 2 0 0 2 1 0 
API 
2010 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
2011 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 
CP 
2010 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: AR = Adjusted Results; EBITDA = Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization; PFO =Profit from operations; EBIT = Earnings before interest and 
taxes; API = Adjusted pre-tax income; CP = Core profit 
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4.1.4. Outcome of reporting NGE metrics  
 
An analysis of the effects of reported NGE adjustments is conducted in Table 8. The 
results of this analysis shows that the adjustments made to GE result in an increase in 
profit leading to NGE that are greater than GE (74.7% of the companies in 2010 and 75.6% 
of the companies in 2011). Interestingly, there are companies that make adjustments that 
lead to decreases in profits, i.e., NGE lower than GE 16.5% in 2010 and 12.8% in 2011). 
In all, Table 8 results clearly show that most reported NGE are higher than GE. 
 
Table 8: The outcome of reporting NGE metrics* 
 
 
  Decrease 
a loss 
Increase 
a loss 
Decrease 
a profit 
Increase 
a profit 
Make a loss 
a profit 
Make a 
profit a loss 
Total 
2010 
Frequency 5  13 59  2 79 
Percentage 6.3%  16.5% 74.7%  2.5% 100% 
2011 
Frequency 3 1 10 59 2 3 78 
Percentage 3.8% 1.3% 12.8% 75.6% 2.6% 3.8% 100% 
Note:  
* The outcome of reporting the largest NGE metric. 
** The percentage of firms reporting NGE metrics with a particular outcome as a percentage of the total 
number of firms reporting NGE metrics in the year (79 firms in 2010; 78 firms in 2011).  
 
4.2 Correlations 
Pearson correlation coefficients are computed for correlations between the variables 
(Table 9). Several correlations are greater than 0.5 and significant at the p<0.05 and 
p<0.01 levels. Important correlations to note are those between MKTRETURN and AR, 
PFO, CP and RECURRING. All of these correlations are positive and significant 
(p<0.01). This suggests that certain forms of NGE are value relevant and the usual items 
of income used for adjusting GE to NGE are also value relevant. 
 
Among the control variables SURPRISE, SIZE and HSCCI25 are associated positively 
and significantly (at p<0.05 or p<0.01), all of which is logical. SURPRISE represents 
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improvement over last year’s performance, SIZE is an indicator of relative strength in the 
market and HSCCI25 companies are the most actively traded Red Chip companies in 
HKSE). LOSS and YEAR have significant negative associations (at p<0.05 and p<0.01, 
respectively). The negative association for LOSS indicates that, as expected, it is value 
relevant signal for the market. The negative association for YEAR simply suggests that in 
2011 the market had lower returns than in 2010. 
 
Table 9 also shows that many of the independent variables are correlated, which raises 
multicollinearity concerns. Therefore, variance inflation factors (VIF) are computed 
when analyzing the multivariate regressions. Hair et al (1995) suggest multicollinearity 
do not affect the multivariate results when the VIFs are well below the threshold of 10. 
All our VIFs are well below the threshold. 
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Table 9: Pearson Correlation 
 MKTRETURN NGE GE AR EBIT EBITDA API PFO CP RECURRING 
NON- 
RECURRING 
REPORTING 
INCONSISTENCIES 
ADJUSTMENT- 
INCONSISTENCIES 
MKTRETURN 1.000 -0.078 0.049 0.275** 0.075 0.103 -0.053 0.269** 0.313** 0.224** -0.149 0.107 -0.156* 
NGE -0.078 1.000 0.026 -0.009 -0.140 -0.412** -0.099 -0.008 -0.116 0.031 -0.034 0.073 0.163* 
GE 0.049 0.026 1.000 0.311** -0.027 -0.131 -0.019 0.223** 0.111 0.281** -0.069 0.097 0.134 
AR 0.275** -0.009 0.311** 1.000 -0.061 0.152 -0.043 0.395** 0.216** 0.395** -0.088 0.249** -0.076 
EBIT 0.075 -0.140 -0.027 -0.061 1.000 -0.060 -0.009 -0.031 -0.054 -0.052 0.044 0.151 0.078 
EBITDA 0.103 -.412** -0.131 0.152 -0.060 1.000 -0.043 .214** .190* 0.033 -0.035 .200* 0.030 
API -0.053 -0.099 -0.019 -0.043 -0.009 -0.043 1.000 -0.062 -0.046 -0.071 0.015 0.107 0.055 
PFO 0.269** -0.008 0.223** 0.395** -0.031 0.214** -0.062 1.000 0.549** 0.809** 0.062 0.183* 0.008 
CP 0.313** -0.116 0.111 0.216** -0.054 0.190* -0.046 0.549** 1.000 0.347** -0.531** 0.157* -0.002 
RECURRING 0.224** 0.031 0.281** 0.395** -0.052 0.033 -0.071 0.809** 0.347** 1.000 -0.130 0.111 0.108 
NON-RECURRING -0.149 -0.034 -0.069 -0.088 0.044 -0.035 0.015 0.062 -.531** -0.130 1.000 -0.106 -0.135 
REPORTING 
INCONSISTENCIES 
0.107 0.073 0.097 0.249** 0.151 0.200* 0.107 0.183* 0.157* 0.111 -0.106 1.000 0.020 
ADJUSTMENT- 
INCONSISTENCIES 
-0.156* 0.163* 0.134 -0.076 0.078 0.030 0.055 0.008 -0.002 0.108 -0.135 0.020 1.000 
RECON 0.054 0.430** 0.124 0.140 0.057 0.134 0.040 0.350** 0.125 0.257** -0.074 0.341** 0.121 
SURPRISE .222** -0.106 0.077 0.063 0.039 0.040 0.004 0.153 .414** .176* -.518** 0.063 0.008 
BI 0.000 0.033 -0.086 -0.110 0.037 -0.126 -0.035 -0.089 -0.126 0.030 0.038 0.047 -0.015 
IAC 0.058 -0.039 -0.307** -0.102 -0.020 0.043 0.045 0.017 -0.022 0.029 -0.085 0.025 0.070 
OC 0.104 -0.239** 0.082 0.177* -0.155* 0.094 0.147 0.092 0.027 0.112 0.139 -0.024 -0.272** 
LEV -0.070 0.146 0.201* -0.001 0.189* -0.110 -0.068 0.014 -0.112 0.159* -0.003 -0.068 -0.031 
SIZE 0.179* -0.110 0.113 0.308** 0.117 0.152 0.045 0.426** 0.291** 0.435** -0.096 0.201** -0.294** 
LOSS -.191* -0.017 -0.068 -.155* -0.031 -0.097 -0.022 -.275** -.569** -.190* .253** -.223** 0.041 
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BIG4 -0.021 -0.063 0.065 0.033 0.030 -0.088 0.021 -0.094 -0.105 -0.086 0.045 0.081 -0.286** 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.096 0.053 0.055 -0.009 0.025 -0.012 0.018 0.078 0.010 0.104 -0.013 0.088 -0.008 
YEAR -0.458** -0.039 0.019 -0.046 -0.003 -0.002 -0.081 0.002 -0.020 0.047 -0.011 -0.037 0.021 
HSCCI25 0.251** -0.039 0.121 0.314** 0.202** 0.048 -0.043 0.308** 0.219** 0.298** -0.094 0.249** -0.269** 
GLOBAL 0.132 0.117 0.028 0.194* 0.047 -0.013 0.033 0.197* 0.309** 0.134 -0.168* 0.208** -0.230** 
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 RECON SURPRISE BI IAC OC LEV SIZE LOSS BIG4 INSTITUTIONAL YEAR HSCCI25 GLOBAL 
MKTRETURN 0.054 0.222** 0.000 0.058 0.104 -0.070 0.179* -0.191* -0.021 0.096 -0.458** 0.251** 0.132 
NGE 0.430** -0.106 0.033 -0.039 -0.239** 0.146 -0.110 -0.017 -0.063 0.053 -0.039 -0.039 0.117 
GE 0.124 0.077 -0.086 -0.307** 0.082 0.201* 0.113 -0.068 0.065 0.055 0.019 0.121 0.028 
AR 0.140 0.063 -0.110 -0.102 0.177* -0.001 0.308** -0.155* 0.033 -0.009 -0.046 0.314** 0.194* 
EBIT 0.057 0.039 0.037 -0.020 -0.155* 0.189* 0.117 -0.031 0.030 0.025 -0.003 0.202** 0.047 
EBITDA 0.134 0.040 -0.126 0.043 0.094 -0.110 0.152 -0.097 -0.088 -0.012 -0.002 0.048 -0.013 
API 0.040 0.004 -0.035 0.045 0.147 -0.068 0.045 -0.022 0.021 0.018 -0.081 -0.043 0.033 
PFO 0.350** 0.153 -0.089 0.017 0.092 0.014 0.426** -0.275** -0.094 0.078 0.002 0.308** 0.197* 
CP 0.125 0.414** -0.126 -0.022 0.027 -0.112 0.291** -0.569** -0.105 0.010 -0.020 0.219** 0.309** 
RECURRING 0.257** 0.176* 0.030 0.029 0.112 0.159* 0.435** -0.190* -0.086 0.104 0.047 0.298** 0.134 
NON-RECURRING -0.074 -0.518** 0.038 -0.085 0.139 -0.003 -0.096 0.253** 0.045 -0.013 -0.011 -0.094 -0.168* 
REPORTING 
INCONSISTENCIES 
0.341** 0.063 0.047 0.025 -0.024 -0.068 0.201** -0.223** 0.081 0.088 -0.037 0.249** 0.208** 
ADJUSTMENT- 
INCONSISTENCIES 
0.121 0.008 -0.015 0.070 -0.272** -0.031 -0.294** 0.041 -0.286** -0.008 0.021 -0.269** -0.230** 
RECON 1.000 -0.102 -0.165* 0.104 0.099 0.078 0.170* -0.318** 0.042 0.093 -0.014 0.140 0.201* 
SURPRISE -0.102 1.000 0.043 0.105 -0.132 0.027 0.061 -0.120 -0.129 0.084 -0.156* 0.085 -0.096 
BI -0.165* 0.043 1.000 0.101 -0.031 0.115 -0.083 0.101 -0.081 0.016 0.021 0.115 -0.132 
IAC 0.104 0.105 0.101 1.000 -0.083 0.079 -0.057 0.029 -0.154* 0.026 0.005 -0.106 -0.148 
OC 0.099 -0.132 -0.031 -0.083 1.000 -0.017 0.223** -0.196* 0.202** -0.063 0.011 0.110 0.076 
LEV 0.078 0.027 0.115 0.079 -0.017 1.000 .259** -0.006 0.048 -0.029 0.075 0.133 -0.006 
SIZE 0.170* 0.061 -0.083 -0.057 .223** 0.259** 1.000 -0.283** 0.189* -0.190* 0.034 0.676** 0.433** 
LOSS -0.318** -0.120 0.101 0.029 -0.196* -0.006 -0.283** 1.000 -0.018 0.064 0.038 -0.155* -0.336** 
BIG4 0.042 -0.129 -0.081 -0.154* 0.202** 0.048 0.189* -0.018 1.000 -0.061 -0.016 0.090 0.225** 
INSTITUTIONAL 0.093 0.084 0.016 0.026 -0.063 -0.029 -0.190* 0.064 -0.061 1.000 0.007 -0.143 -0.097 
YEAR -0.014 -0.156* 0.021 0.005 0.011 0.075 0.034 0.038 -0.016 0.007 1.000 0.012 -0.038 
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** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
HSCCI25 0.140 0.085 0.115 -0.106 0.110 0.133 .676** -0.155* 0.090 -0.143 0.012 1.000 0.235** 
GLOBAL 0.201* -0.096 -0.132 -0.148 0.076 -0.006 0.433** -0.336** 0.225** -0.097 -0.038 0.235** 1.000 
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4.3 Regression results 
 
Tables 10 and 11 report regression results for NGE market relevance (Models 1 and 2). 
The regression procedure used is General Linear Model (GLM). GLM allows for the 
estimation of the effects of interactions between variables.  
 
Model 1 tests hypotheses 1 to 5. We estimate a full version and a parsimonious version3  
of the model (Table 10). The F-statistics of both versions are significant (p<0.01), and 
the adjusted R2 are 0.314 and 0.324, which are quite high for the small size of the sample. 
Therefore, Model 1 is robust in terms of explaining the variations in MKTRETURN. For 
the variables of concern, we find that NGE is not value relevant, but GE is (p<0.05 and 
p<0.01), which supports H1. Of all the forms of reported NGE only EBITDA seems to 
have a positive association with MKTRETURN (p<0.05). Also, none of the forms of 
reporting have any associations with MKTRETURN, which supports H2. REPORTING-
INCONSISTENCIES have no association with MKTRETURN, which supports H3. 
ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES has a negative association with MKTRETURN 
(p<0.05), which rejects H4, and suggests that firms with low returns are likely to have 
between year inconsistencies in items used to adjust GE to NGE. RECON has no 
association with MKTRETURN, which does not support H5. 
 
In short, neither NGE nor its various forms and its reconciliation with GE have any 
consistent significant associations with MKTRETURN. However, GE does have 
significant value relevance. Inconsistencies in adjustments to GE to arrive at NGE have 
an adverse association with MKTRETURN. 
 
The independence of the audit committees and HSCCI25 also has significant positive 
relations with market return, which suggest that better audit quality firms and large well-
traded firms have higher market returns (p<0.05).  
                                                             
3 We estimated the model in several ways. The results do not vary significantly across the different ways. 
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Table 10: The Model 1 Results 
MKTRETURN = β0 +β1NGE + β2GE + β3INCONSISTENCIES + β4NGE*INCONSISTENCIES + 
β5RECON + β6NGE*RECON + β7CONTROLS + ε   
Variable 
Full Model with 
all variables 
t values 
Parsimonious version with 
reduced control variables 
t values 
Intercept -1.171 -1.185 
NGE 1.604 1.842* 
GE 2.556* 2.837** 
AR 0.278 0.468 
EBIT -0.529 -0.834 
EBITDA 2.005* 2.252* 
API -0.123 -0.209 
PFO 0.682 0.696 
CP -0.326 -0.089 
NGE * AR -0.599 -0.861 
NGE * EBIT 0.512 0.647 
NGE * EBITDA -1.483 -1.712* 
NGE * API 0.466 0.511 
NGE * PFO -0.953 -1.078 
NGE * CP (This variable is redundant) . . 
REPORTING-INCONSISTENCIES -0.819 -0.695 
ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES  -2.092* -1.952* 
RECON 0.300 0.064 
SURPRISE 0.530 0.481 
NGE * REPORTING INCONSISTENCIES 0.362 0.071 
NGE * RECON -1.224 -0.981 
NGE * SURPRISE -0.892 -0.650 
NGE * ADJUSTMENT- INCONSISTENCIES 1.030 0.661 
BI 0.099  
IAC 1.840* 1.588 
OC 0.620  
LEV -1.120  
SIZE 0.156  
LOSS 0.620  
BIG4 -0.771  
INSTITUTIONAL 1.430  
HSCCI25 1.708* 1.825* 
GLOBAL -0.458  
YEAR and Industry Controlled    
Adj_R_Sq 0.314 0.324 
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F 2.857** 3.351** 
 
 
Model 2 tests hypotheses 6 and 7. We estimate a full version and a parsimonious 
version4 of the model (Table 11). The F-statistic of Model 1 is significant (p<0.01) for 
both versions, and the adjusted R2 are 0.346 and 0.336, respectively, which is reasonably 
high. Therefore, the model is robust in terms of explaining the variations in 
MKTRETURN.  
 
Results for Model 2 in Table 11 show that contrary to the predictions of H6, 
RECURRING has a positive association with MKTRETURN (p<0.05). Also, NON-
RECURRING has no significant association with MKT-RETURN, which does not 
support H7. ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES, once again, has a negative 
association with MKTRETURN (p<0.05), which supports H4. However, when 
interacted with RECURRING and NON-RECURRING, ADJUSTMENT-
INCONSISTENCIES provides a positive association for those two variables with 
MKTRETURN (p<0.01 and p<0.05, respectively). This result suggests that changes in 
adjustment items to derive NGE have value relevant information.  
 
The interaction of NON-RECURRING and RECON has a significant negative association 
with MKTRETURN (p<0.05), which is contrary to the prediction of H5. It means that 
reconciliation of unusual components of earnings provides less value relevant 
information.  
 
In short, the usual items of earnings, when used for NGE computation, are value 
relevant contrary to the common belief that unusual items adjustments lead to value 
relevant information. It seems that it is the unusual items that are less value relevant. 
Also, changes in items used for computing NGE across years seem to make the 
recurring and non-recurring components of NGE value relevant. 
                                                             
4 We estimated the model in several ways. The results do not vary significantly across the different ways. 
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IAC and HSCCI25 are once again positively and significantly associated with market 
returns (p<0.05). The significant and negative relation (p<0.05) between LOSS and 
MKTRETURN indicates that loss has an adverse economic consequence for a company. 
 
Table 11: Model 2 Results 
MKTRETURN = β0 +β1RECURRING + β2NON-RECURRING + β3INCONSISTENCIES + 
β4RECURRING*INCONSISTENCIES + β5NON-RECURRING*INCONSISTENCIES + β6RECON 
+ β7RECURRING*RECON + β8NON-RECURRING*RECON + β9CONTROLS + ε  
Variable 
Full Model with 
all variables 
t values 
Parsimonious version with 
reduced control variables 
t values 
Intercept -0.571 -1.767* 
RECURRING 1.877* 1.868* 
NON-RECURRING 1.279 0.702 
REPORTING-INCONSISTENCIES -0.730 -0.136 
ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES  -2.083* -2.304* 
RECON 0.790 1.037 
SURPRISE 2.083* 1.868* 
RECURRING * REPORTING-INCONSISTENCIES 0.797 0.247 
RECURRING * ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES 2.840** 2.408* 
RECURRING * RECON -2.148* -1.682* 
RECURRING * SURPRISE -0.637 -0.468 
NON-RECURRING * REPORTING-INCONSISTENCIES 0.176 0.194 
NON-RECURRING * ADJUSTMENT-INCONSISTENCIES 2.076* 1.953* 
NON-RECURRING * RECON  -1.664* -1.142 
NON-RECURRING * SURPRISE -1.448 -1.303 
BI -0.883  
IAC 2.391* 1.930* 
OC 0.497  
LEV -1.274  
SIZE -0.287  
LOSS  -2.064*  
BIG4 -0.500  
INSTITUTIONAL 0.571  
HSCCI25 2.472*  
GLOBAL 0.421  
YEAR and Industry Controlled   
Adj_R_Sq 0.346 0.336 
F 3.593** 4.277** 
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4.4 Sensitivity Tests 
 
We re-estimate our models using an income increasing NGE sub-sample and an income 
reducing NGE and no NGE sub-sample. The income increasing sub-sample has 128 
observations and the results are similar to the full-sample tests. The income decreasing 
an income reducing NGE and no NGE sub-sample is too small to provide meaningful 
results.  
 
We also use the actual NGE and GE difference (income increasing and income decreasing) 
to see if the magnitude of the difference would affect our results. We interact this 
magnitude with our various NGE related test variables of Model 1, NGE, NGE reporting 
and adjustment inconsistencies. We find no significant change in the results (Results not 
reported). 
 
The inference we can derive from these tests is that our results are mainly driven by 
income increasing NGE. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the relevance of NGE reporting in a less regulated and less intense 
information environment, the environment of Red Chip companies of the HKSE. We 
also examine the relevance of reporting and measurement inconsistencies. We find that 
the companies disclose NGE metrics in a variety of ways. The most commonly used 
terms used for reported NGE are “adjusted results” and “EBITDA”.  
 
We find that tax, interest/financial cost, and gain/loss on investment are the three main 
adjustment items used for deriving NGE, not all firms make identical adjustments 
across years and there are variations in adjustments used across firms.  
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Our results contradict the argument that NGE are more informative and more closely 
associated with the stock price and more predictive of future earnings. We note that 
NGE and its various forms and the reconciliation with GE have no consistent significant 
value relevance. The usual items of earnings used for NGE computation seem to be 
value relevant contrary to the idea that unusual items adjustments lead to value relevant 
NGE. Finally, changes in items used for computing NGE across years make the 
components of NGE value relevant. Therefore, the so-called inconsistencies in reporting 
may have informational value for investors. 
 
Another notable finding is that most firms disclose the reconciliation between GE and 
NGE profit, but some either do not disclose their reconciliations or disclosed their 
reconciliations but with undisclosed adjusting items.  
 
This research has its share of limitations. Firstly, being a two-year study; the 
consistency tests do not provide sufficiently rigorous evidence for consistency. Second, 
the research has a small sample size compared to prior studies, which may contribute to 
econometric weaknesses in the results. Therefore, the paper is an exploratory study 
based on the Hong Kong Red Chip firms’ NGE disclosures. Further studies are needed 
to have stronger evidence on the relevance of NGE disclosures using larger and more 
diverse samples to derive more generalizable results. Finally, issues such as emphasis 
placed on NGE metrics by the firm and the news media could also be tested. As an 
initial paper in the area, this paper opens up avenues for further research on the various 
aspects of actual reported NGE and also NGE reporting in rapidly growing markets 
such as China. 
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